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**AFGHANISTAN SITUATION REPORT****CONTENTS**

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**CONTINUED SABOTAGE WITHIN THE AFGHAN AIR FORCE**

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Saboteurs are continuing their efforts to blow up aircraft and assassinate Afghan Air Force personnel, prompting Afghan intelligence to increase its personnel at Air Force bases.

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**FINANCING SNAGS DELAY SUPPLY SHIPMENTS**

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Afghan resistance leader Masood is trying to double his supplies, especially of ordnance, but increased transportation costs have prevented about a third of the material from arriving in the Panjsher Valley so far.

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**PERSPECTIVE****AFGHANISTAN: LIMITS TO US PRESSURE FOR RESISTANCE  
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A low US profile is essential to the success of efforts to foster resistance unity and gain international support for the Afghan cause.

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**CONTINUED SABOTAGE WITHIN THE AFGHAN AIR FORCE**

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[redacted] since the successful sabotage incident at Shindand Airbase in June, Air Force saboteurs have blown up two MIG-17s at Qandahar; tried but failed to set off 25 powerful time bombs at Bagram Airbase; and twice tried to sabotage the aircraft of General Abdul Fatah, the second in command of the Air Force. [redacted] KHAD has increased its personnel at Air Force bases in the wake of the sabotage incidents. [redacted]

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**Comment:** Saboteurs have plagued the Air Force since the Soviet invasion. [redacted]

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[redacted] indicate that saboteurs blew up an ammunition dump and diluted air fuel at airbases in 1983 and 1982, and [redacted] KHAD executed four officers in 1983 for removing bomb fuses. [redacted]

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**FINANCING SNAGS DELAY SUPPLY SHIPMENTS**

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Afghan insurgent leader Masood is attempting to bring roughly 440 tons of nonfood supplies into the Panjsher Valley this year--roughly double last year's level.

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approximately 300 tons of material have been moved to date, but problems with transportation financing have delayed the remainder of the supplies.

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food is readily available in the Panjsher.

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**Comment:** The increased demand for ordnance and other supplies, combined with a shortage of pack animals, has caused transportation costs to roughly double in the past year, Last year ordnance comprised about 80 percent of the material shipped, but the percentage this year is reported to be substantially higher.

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**IN BRIEF**

-- a Soviet ammunition storage facility in northwestern Kabul was severely damaged on 19 September. Fourteen of 17 open storage areas were destroyed--suggesting insurgents or saboteurs were responsible. If so, it means the insurgents are increasingly capable of attacking the Soviets within their own secure areas.

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-- The recently concluded tribal assembly in Kabul sought to exploit discontent between the border tribes and Islamabad,

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The Babrak regime also used the assembly to promote its claim to legitimacy.

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-- A shootout at the People's House Palace in Kabul two weeks ago was caused by infighting between Parchami and Khalqi army factions, according to the US Embassy in Kabul. As many as 14 people were killed in the skirmishes, and tape recordings of the firefight show that extended exchanges of AK-47 and heavy machinegun fire occurred.

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**PERSPECTIVE****AFGHANISTAN: LIMITS TO US PRESSURE FOR RESISTANCE UNITY**

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A low US profile is essential to the success of efforts to foster resistance unity and generate international support for the Afghan cause. With the proper balance of Pakistani and US guidance and an atmosphere conducive to the alliance reaching its own decisions, the alliance has a fair chance of evolving gradually into a mechanism for better focusing international political attention on the Afghan issue and improving military cooperation among insurgent groups.

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**Alliance Tensions and the US Role**

Like the shaky, shifting alliances that preceded it, the Ittihad Islami suffers from ethnic, tribal, and religious differences and the conflicting ambitions of several leaders. Although alliance members welcome US aid, the nature of the US political role is a source of friction.

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Alliance groups led by Gailani, Mojadedi, and Nabi--which are linked with the former Afghan ruling classes and the West--favor a stronger US political role. The fundamentalists--led by Gulbuddin, Khalis, Rabbani, and Sayyaf--who desire an Islamic republic in Afghanistan, tend to be anti-Western as well as anti-Communist. They are the strongest forces in the resistance. Some fundamentalists are probably in accord with the views of Gulbuddin, who has publicly stated his belief that the United States is involved in aiding the resistance primarily to gain influence and prevent establishment of an Iranian-style republic in Afghanistan.

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Another influential fundamentalist leader, Abdul Rasoul Sayyaf, also often takes a publicly anti-Western stance. If Islamic fundamentalists come to agree that the alliance is a US

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[redacted]

tool, Sayyaf, Gulbuddin, and perhaps others are likely to opt out. Even more moderate Peshawar exile leaders would see strong US involvement as undercutting their efforts to rebut charges that they are pawns of the United States. [redacted]

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US leverage can best be exerted through third parties. Pressure from Pakistan is acceptable to the insurgents generally, and many US objectives probably can be best effected through Pakistan. In order to foster the legitimacy of the alliance, the United States probably will have to avoid direct involvement in the alliance's decision-making process and in other resistance activities likely to draw media attention. Because anti-US rhetoric from resistance leaders like Gulbuddin provides the alliance with an aura of independence, it might be wise for the United States to promote such criticism occasionally and quietly. [redacted]

[redacted]

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### Pakistani Concerns

President Zia welcomes insurgent pressure on the Soviets and wishes to maintain a good relationship with the United States, but Islamabad has its own fears about a too visible US role. The US Embassy in Islamabad recently noted indications of Pakistani unhappiness about US contacts with resistance leaders and the US effort to have a resistance delegation attend this fall's UNGA session.

- Islamabad fears that widespread perception of the Afghan struggle as an East-West issue would link Pakistan too openly with the West and lead to increased Soviet military and political pressure.
- Islamabad does not want to see an insurgent alliance become too potent a military and political force because it fears such a force might be subject to manipulation by Pakistani opposition parties and factions.
- Islamabad also is concerned that the Saudis may seek to dominate the resistance council. A strong Saudi hand in the fundamentalist alliance during 1983 and 1984 intensified rivalries among resistance groups.

[redacted]

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[REDACTED]

-- Pakistan may believe that an increased role by the United States or Saudi Arabia in the new alliance would lead the Iranians to introduce complications for the insurgency. Iranian officials at various times have hampered operations and resupply for some Sunni insurgent groups because they had Saudi backing. [REDACTED]

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### The UN Angle

Outside pressure--best applied by Pakistan--would be essential to ensure the selection of a capable, unified delegation to advance alliance interests. A fractious delegation would discredit the resistance. A delegation closely linked with the United States would alienate some Third World countries, such as Iran, and we believe the annual resolution calling for the withdrawal of foreign troops from Afghanistan would lose support. [REDACTED]

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Use of intermediaries to persuade Iran or Turkey to help an Afghan resistance delegation establish political and media contacts would provide proper distance from the United States. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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